A collective model for female labour supply with nonparticipation and taxation. by Vermeulen, F.M.P.












This paper presents a collective discrete-choice model for female labour
supply. Preferences of females and the intrahousehold allocation process
are both econometrically identiﬁed. The model incorporates nonpartici-
pation and nonlinear taxation. It is applied to Belgian microdata and is
used to evaluate two revenue-neutral versions of the 2001 Tax Reform Act.
We ﬁnd small positive behavioural responses to the reforms. The reforms
are not unambiguously welfare improving. Generally, the ﬁrst revenue-
neutral reform (the actual reform and a household lump-sum tax) is more
beneﬁcial to females in couples than the second (the actual reform and a
proportional decrease of household disposable incomes).
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Evaluations of the impact of tax reforms on employment and hours of work are
usually cast in the unitary framework, which assumes that households, even if
they consist of several individuals, behave as if they were single decision-making
units. Recent examples of such tax reform evaluations include Hoynes (1996)
and Blundell et al. (1999). One important deﬁciency of the unitary approach,
from a welfare economic point of view, is that it is not able to say anything about
the intrahousehold allocation of welfare. Apps and Rees (1988) and Brett (1998)
have shown, however, that normative welfare analyses cannot, in general, ignore
intrahousehold distributional issues. Another shortcoming of the approach is
that its theoretical implications seem to be overly restrictive. These implications
were consequently repeatedly rejected when confronted with household labour
supply data (see Fortin and Lacroix, 1997 for some recent evidence).
A valuable alternative to the unitary approach is the collective approach to
household behaviour. This approach, introduced by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and
Apps and Rees (1988), takes account of the fact that multi-person households
consist of several individuals who each have their own preferences. It is assumed
that these individuals are involved in an intrahousehold bargaining process that
results in Pareto-eﬃcient intrahousehold allocations. The collective approach
implies other behavioural restrictions than the unitary model (see, e.g., Chiap-
pori, 1988, 1992, and Browning and Chiappori, 1998). Contrary to the unitary
model’s restrictions, the testable implications of the collective model turn out to
be less restrictive (see references in Vermeulen, 2002a). Moreover, the speciﬁc
setting of the collective model makes it possible to analyse the intrahousehold
welfare distribution under some additional assumptions (see Chiappori, 1988,
1992). Clear evidence of conﬂicting outcomes of the unitary and collective
approaches with respect to welfare evaluations of tax reforms is given in the
diﬀerent contributions in Laisney (2002).
Over time, many topics in the labour supply literature have been translated
into a collective setting. Chiappori (1988, 1992) and Chiappori, Fortin and
Lacroix (2002) derive collective restrictions and identiﬁcation results with re-
spect to individual preferences and the intrahousehold allocation process. These
studies do not take into account taxation and nonparticipation. Blundell et
al. (2001) derive testable implications and identiﬁcation results for a collective
labour supply model that allows for both nonparticipation and unobserved pref-
erence heterogeneity. Nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation are explored in
Donni (2003). Under some additional assumptions, partial identiﬁcation of in-
dividual preferences and the intrahousehold allocation process is possible. The
model, without nonparticipation, was applied in Moreau and Donni (2002).
To the best of our knowledge, the only empirical studies that tackle both
nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation are the contributions in Laisney (2002).
These studies model household labour supply as a discrete-choice problem. In-
dividuals are thus assumed to have the choice between a discrete set of labour
supply options. This approach, which is rather popular nowadays, allows incor-
porating very general nonlinear and nonconvex tax schemes (see van Soest, 1995,
Bingley and Walker, 1997, Keane and Moﬃtt, 1998, Blundell et al., 1999, and
Gong and van Soest, 2002). In Laisney (2002), individual preferences and the
intrahousehold allocation process are identiﬁed, in a piecemeal way, by means
of both econometric estimation and a calibration stage.
2The aim of this paper is to present a collective and econometrically identiﬁ-
able discrete-choice model for female labour supply. The model is fairly general
in that it incorporates both nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation. The focus
on female choice behaviour is driven by the empirical observation that almost
all men in the sample we use are employed full-time. Their contractual working
hours typically reﬂect the number of hours that are worked in many economic
sectors. The intrahousehold allocation process and the preferences of women in
couples are completely identiﬁed by assuming that their preferences are egois-
tic and to some extent identical to those of single women. Egoistic preferences
are more restrictive than those assumed in Laisney (2002). In the latter study,
externalities within a household with respect to labour supply were allowed at
the cost of a piecemeal identiﬁcation procedure. Alternatively, our assumption
is less restrictive than the assumption of equal preferences between singles and
individuals in couples that was made in Barmby and Smith (2001) to obtain
complete identiﬁcation. Moreover, their model does not take into account non-
linear taxation and nonparticipation issues.
It will be shown that the model presented here allows for richer behavioural
implications than the unitary model. The model is also able to say something
about who gets what in the household. Consequently, normative welfare analy-
ses can be done at the individual level, rather than at the household level. The
model is applied to Belgian microdata. The sample selection is for childless
individuals who are working or are voluntarily unemployed. Students, the self-
employed, the involuntarily unemployed and retired people are excluded from
the dataset. The model will be used as a basis for an evaluation of the im-
pact on employment, hours and individual consumption of the Belgian 2001
Tax Reform Act, which was implemented between the years 2001 and 2004 and
embodies some important changes with respect to the pre reform tax system.
Since this reform is not revenue-neutral, we will actually evaluate two alterna-
tive tax reforms that preserve revenue-neutrality. The ﬁrst of these reforms adds
a lump-sum tax imposed on households to the actual reform. The alternative
reform implies a proportional decrease of the disposable income of households
after implementation of the actual reform. Although both reforms generate
the same tax revenue, they may have diﬀerent eﬀects on labour supply and
intrahousehold allocations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
economic model that is cast in a collective framework. Section 3 brieﬂy describes
the current Belgian tax system and covers the main features of the 2001 Tax
Reform Act. Section 4 discusses the data and presents model estimates. Tax
reform simulation results are given in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 The economic model
2.1 A sharing rule interpretation
We consider households consisting of two working-age individuals (m and f)
and female singles. Labour supply of single men and of men in couples is
assumed to be ﬁxed at full-time working hours. Empirical evidence for this
assumption is given in Section 4. Note that the assumption is also supported by
Pencavel (1986), who concludes that male labour supply is rather insensitive to
3changes in economic variables such as wages and nonlabour income. Further, it
is assumed that preferences of individuals in couples are egoistic (see Chiappori,
1988). In other words, utility is derived from only own consumption and leisure.
Preferences of females are represented by the following well-behaved direct
utility function:
uf = vf ¡
cf,l f,df¢
, (1)
where cf denotes the female’s private consumption of a Hicksian aggregate com-
modity, lf is leisure and df is a vector of demographic characteristics (e.g., a
variable indicating whether the female is single or living in a couple, age and ed-
ucation level). Budget constraints for female singles and couples are respectively
equal to




cm + cf ≤ y + wm m + wf f − τc ¡
wm m,w f f,y,dm,df¢
= x, (3)
where wi denotes individual i’s gross hourly wage rate,  i is individual i’s labour
supply ( i = T − li,w h e r eT is total time available), cm is the male’s private
consumption, y is nonlabour or other income and τf and τc are tax functions
that capture the income tax, which generally depends on earned incomes, other
income and demographic characteristics. Finally, denote total household means
by x.1
The core assumption in the collective approach is that individuals in couples
choose Pareto-eﬃcient allocations (see Chiappori, 1988, 1992). It is a well-
known result that if preferences are of the egoistic type and budget constraints
are linear, then any Pareto-eﬃcient allocation can be represented as a two-stage
budgeting process. In the ﬁrst stage, household members divide total household
nonlabour income among themselves. In the second step, each individual maxi-
mizes her or his own utility subject to an individual budget constraint resulting
from the ﬁrst-stage allocation. This result has been generalized by Donni (2003)
to a setting with nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation giving rise to convex
budget sets. In our model with ﬁxed male labour supply, Pareto-eﬃciency of







where φ is a function determining the part of total household consumption x
that is transferred to the woman in the couple.2 Following Chiappori (1988), we
call φ the sharing rule. In general, this sharing rule will depend on a number of
variables z that inﬂuence an individual’s bargaining power in the household. In
Chiappori (1988, 1992), individual wages and other income act as such variables.
In a setting with nonlinear income taxation, however, these variables seem to be
less adequate. Our empirical exercise will make use of a variable that has already
proved useful in the diﬀerent contributions in Laisney (2002). It captures the
earning capacity of the female in the household. The variable is deﬁned as the
diﬀerence between total household consumption when the female works full-time
and total household consumption when she does not participate in the labour
4market. This variable thus incorporates elements related to her productivity
and elements related to the nonlinear tax system.3
How can we now identify eﬃciently both preferences of females, as repre-
sented by vf, and the sharing rule, as represented by φ? Note that in labour
supply datasets, only total household consumption (net income) is observed, and
not the private consumption levels cm and cf. This rules out a direct estimation
of females’ preferences by means of the variables cf and  f, via a discrete-choice
model, for instance.
One possibility to identify preferences and the sharing rule is to make use
of observed labour supply behaviour of single women (in addition to couples’
behaviour). Note that preferences of singles can easily be identiﬁed by means
of standard techniques, since the unitary approach is fully applicable to them.
In Barmby and Smith (2001), for example, preferences of individuals in couples
are identiﬁed by assuming that their preferences equal those of singles. As will
be shown below, we do not have to go that far to identify both preferences
and the sharing rule. However, our assumption to obtain complete identiﬁcation
is more restrictive than the approach followed by Chiappori (1988, 1992) and
Donni (2003). The latter studies make use of only the information in a couples
dataset to identify the sharing rule up to an additive constant and preferences
up to a translation (i.e., incomplete identiﬁcation).
2.2 Empirical speciﬁcation of the model
We opt for a discrete-choice model for female labour supply. This approach,
which was introduced by van Soest (1995), assumes that individuals can choose
between a limited number of labour supply options. The speciﬁc setting allows
incorporating very general (e.g., nonlinear and noncontinuous) tax schemes. The
optimization problem consists of comparing the diﬀerent utility levels associated
with each of the available hours choices and choosing the one that yields the
highest utility.
Let us assume that females have J labour supply choices, each associated
with a particular consumption level. Preferences of females are assumed to be
representable by a restricted version of the quadratic direct utility function (see
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ij and εij is an unobserved preference component that is
assumed to be distributed as a type I extreme value random variable. The












are assumed to be heterogeneous























i + υ i. (7)
5Following Train (1998), an extra source of unobserved preference heterogeneity
across individuals is introduced via the disturbances υ  i and υ i. These are
assumed to be mean zero normally distributed and independent of each other:







Necessary elements for the application of a discrete-choice model are the
individual consumption levels c
f
ij associated with the diﬀerent labour supply
choices. For single females, these consumption levels are observed, given gross
wage rates (observed for participants, estimated for nonparticipants; cf. infra),
other income, individual characteristics and the tax system. As already men-
tioned, private consumption levels of women in couples are not observed. We
know, however, that the female’s private consumption at the j’th labour supply
choice c
f
ij equals the share of total household consumption xij that is allocated
to her by means of the sharing rule φ. Let us assume that this sharing rule is
of the following form:
φ(xij,z i)=( 1+κ1 + κ2zi) · xij,( 8 )
where zi is the female’s earning capacity, and κ1 and κ2 are parameters that
a r et ob ee s t i m a t e d . 4 Note that 0 < 1+κ1 + κ2zi < 1. By making use of a
dummy variable si, which indicates whether female i is single (si =0 )or living
in a couple (si =1 ) ,w ec a nd e ﬁne a budget constraint that is simultaneously
applicable to both single females and those in couples:
c
f
ij =( 1+κ1si + κ2sizi) · xij.( 9 )
Substituting equation (9) for c
f
ij in equation (5), we obtain the following ‘col-
lective’ female utility function with observable regressors:
u
f
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ij · (1 + κ1si + κ2sizi) · xij (10)









Application of this structural form in a random-parameters logit model results
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Equations (11) and (12) imply two testable restrictions of this collective labour
supply model. The underlying idea is that the female’s private consumption can
change only via the sharing rule that allocates total household consumption to
both household members. Since the female’s private consumption occurs twice
in the given functional form, the sharing rule should twice have the same eﬀect
on female consumption. Note that these restrictions are implied by the speciﬁc
functional form rather than by the collective approach as such.
6It is also clear from equations (10), (11) and (12) that the equality of the
preference parameters βc  and βc for single women and females in couples is
necessary and suﬃcient for the identiﬁcation of both female preferences and the
sharing rule. Without it, preferences and the sharing rule cannot be disentan-
gled. Nevertheless, there is much room for preference variation between singles













Marginal rates of substitution between consumption and leisure may well diﬀer,
implying that the above assumption does not seem to be overly restrictive.5
Apart from the above collective restrictions, the model implies the standard
unitary restrictions on the female’s utility function. These restrictions boil down
to the utility function (5) being (strictly) quasi-concave, monotonically increas-
ing in consumption cf and monotonically decreasing in labour supply  f.T h i s








 f +βc cf +β 
¡
df¢







 f + βc cf + β 
¡
df¢¤
− β  
¡
df¢£




Note that the last two restrictions depend on the unobserved disturbances
coming from the assumed preference heterogeneity across individuals. One pos-








3T h e B e l g i a n t a x - b e n e ﬁt system and the 2001
Tax Reform Act
3.1 The Belgian tax-beneﬁts y s t e m
The empirical exercise focuses on a simpliﬁed tax-beneﬁt system. One simpli-
ﬁcation is that the dataset used lacks information on many items that aﬀect
the tax liability of households. Examples of such items are contributions to pri-
vate pension funds and capital redemptions due to mortgage loans. The selected
sample for the empirical exercise also allows us to safely restrict attention to tax
rules that are applicable to labour incomes and to ignore rules on incomes com-
ing from, e.g., pensions and unemployment beneﬁts. Also child beneﬁts do not
have to be taken into account, since we focus on childless households. We will
sketch only the tax system that applies to the selected sample. A more elaborate
discussion of the Belgian tax-beneﬁt system can be found in Vermeulen (2002b).
The simpliﬁed tax scheme for the year 2000 that is used for the sample
of single women consists of four main components. These are (1) the social
security tax that is to be paid by employees, (2) the standard deductions, (3) the
marginal tax rate scheme and (4) the standard tax credits. The social security
tax is equal to a constant rate of 13.07%, which is applied to gross labour
income. In a next step, standard expenses are deducted from labour income
net of social security contributions at a decreasing marginal rate ranging from
20% on the ﬁrst 4,165 euro to 3% on the bracket up to 55,470 euro. After these
7standard deductions, the marginal tax rate scheme is applied to taxable labour
income. This marginal tax rate scheme consists of seven marginal tax rates,
ranging from 25%, applied to the ﬁrst 6,400 euro, to 55% for the taxable labour
income above 61,230 euro. This operation results in the gross tax liability. Net
tax liability is obtained by subtracting the appropriate tax credits. The ﬁrst
tax credit is that related to the basic exemption from income taxation. For
a single, this exemption equals about 5,200 euro. If taxable labour income is
higher than this exemption, a credit of about 1,300 euro is obtained. Next to
this tax credit is the tax credit related to family size. Since the households in
the selected sample are childless, this credit can be ignored in the empirical
exercise. Finally, there is a negative tax credit related to the temporary crisis
surcharge.6 After application of the other tax credits, an extra tax rate of 3%
is applied to the resulting tax liability.
The tax scheme for married couples diﬀers from the above tax scheme in
two respects. First of all, married individuals can make use of the so-called
‘marital quotient’ if some conditions are satisﬁed. This tax rule allows shifting
a part of the taxable labour income of one of the spouses to the other. In our
simpliﬁed tax scheme, couples are allowed to make use of this marital quotient
if the taxable labour income of the spouse with the lowest earnings does not
exceed 30% of the joint taxable labour income. The part that is shifted to
the spouse with the lowest earnings equals 30% of joint taxable labour income,
minus the own taxable labour income of that spouse (with a maximum of about
7,500 euro, however). A second main diﬀerence between the tax scheme for
singles and couples is the basic exemption that is related to the tax credit. This
exemption equals about 4,140 euro for each spouse.
3.2 The 2001 Tax Reform Act
In August 2001, the new Tax Reform Act was proclaimed. This reform was
scheduled for implementation over the period 2001 to 2004, and implies some
relatively sweeping changes of the current tax system. According to the govern-
ment, the cost of this reform is estimated at 3.25 billion euro, or 10.7% of the
amount generated in 2001 by the personal income tax system net of the tem-
porary crisis surcharge (see Reynders, 2000). Worthy of note for the selected
sample in the empirical exercise are four main measures.
The ﬁrst important alteration in the current tax system is the introduction
of a refundable tax credit for the lowest labour incomes. A tax credit of about
620 euro will be given to individuals with a labour income (after deduction of
social security contributions and deductions for professional expenses) between
about 3,700 and 12,400 euro. Eligible working individuals who either do not
pay taxes or pay less taxes than this credit receive an extra income equal to the
diﬀerence between the credit and the taxes paid. Individuals that participate in
the labour market and earn less or more than the above-mentioned boundaries
may be eligible for a reduced tax credit. The government, through this in-work
t a xc r e d i t ,a i m st oi m p r o v ew o r ki n c e n t i v e sb ym a k i n gw o r kp a ya n dt ob o o s t
the income position of some working individuals.
A second feature of the tax reform is the broadening of the middle tax
brackets and the lowering of the two highest marginal tax rates from 52.5%
and 55% to 50%. This measure is introduced to relieve the ﬁscal pressure on
respectively the middle and the highest incomes.
8A third measure equalizes the tax exemption of married individuals and
singles. The current system features diﬀerent tax exemptions for married indi-
viduals and (possibly cohabiting) singles. This exemption is to be brought up
to the higher singles’ level.
Finally, the marital quotient will also be applicable to unmarried individuals
with a cohabitation contract.
The tax reform described above is not revenue-neutral. We will therefore add
two alternative tax parameters to the actual reform in order to preserve revenue-
neutrality. Note that the choice of how revenue-neutrality is obtained is not
entirely innocent in a model focusing on spouses’ bargaining over intrahousehold
allocations; the latter may well diﬀer over diﬀerent tax systems generating the
same revenue. The ﬁrst revenue-neutral reform receiving our focus is the actual
reform complemented with a lump-sum tax at the household level. This lump
sum is deﬁned in such a way that the same tax revenue on couples is generated
as in the pre reform situation. The alternative reform that we focus on decreases
couples’ disposable incomes after application of the actual reform by the same
percentage, such that equal tax revenue is preserved. Of course, both the lump-
sum tax and the percentage decrease in disposable income cannot be determined
beforehand (due to the behavioural reactions). Both tax parameters will be
obtained by means of a trial-and-error procedure in the tax reform simulations.
4 Data and empirical results
4.1 Data
The data are drawn from the 1992 and 1997 Socio-Economic Panel (SEP) of the
Center for Social Policy (University of Antwerp). This panel is representative
of the Belgian population and is primarily used for research into poverty issues,
the eﬀectiveness of social security and welfare distribution.7
Two samples are selected for the empirical exercise. The ﬁrst consists of
female singles without children, aged between 25 and 55 (inclusive), and who
are employed or voluntarily unemployed. Students, the self-employed, the un-
employed and retired people are excluded from the dataset. The second sample
consists of married or de-facto couples subject to the same sample selection as
single females. To minimize the impact of measurement error, individuals with
wages below or above the 1st and 99th percentiles of the wage distribution were
also excluded. The sample sizes are, respectively, 128 and 340 for female singles
and couples. Note that hourly gross wage rates are unobserved for individuals
who do not participate in the labour market. These wages are estimated by
means of Heckman’s two-step estimation procedure (see Vermeulen, 2002b for
more detailed results).
Table 1 provides summary statistics on both selected samples. Histograms
on average weekly contractual hours of singles and individuals in couples are
g i v e ni nF i g u r e s1 - 4 . 8 As is clear from Figures 2 and 4, the labour supply of
men is highly concentrated around 38 hours. Only a small fraction of men
have a contractual labour supply that deviates from this mode. Moreover, there
are no men who are not working in the selected sample. This ﬂeshes out the
assumption made earlier that all men work full-time. Labour supply of women
has a larger variance. Figures 1 and 3 clearly show that an important fraction of
9the females do not participate in the labour market. This fraction is higher for
women in couples than for singles. A not unimportant fraction of the females
are working part-time, with peaks around 20 and 30 hours.
In the empirical exercise, we assume that women have the following discrete-
choice set:  f ∈ {0,20,30,38}.9 For each of these weekly hours choices, the
corresponding household net income (i.e., total household consumption) is cal-
culated. This net income depends on the individuals’ gross hourly wages, the
household’s nonlabour income and the tax system.
[Table 1 about here]
[Figure 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
[Figure 3 about here]
[Figure 4 about here]
4.2 Empirical results
The second column of Table 2 reports unrestricted estimates of the model for
female labour supply (see equation (10)).10 A c c o r d i n gt oal i k e l i h o o dr a t i ot e s t ,
the conditional logit model (in other words, the model without unobserved pref-
erence heterogeneity with respect to
¡
 f¢2 and  f) cannot be rejected. Twice the
diﬀerence between the log likelihood of the unrestricted model and the log like-
lihood of the restricted model equals 0.15. This test statistic is to be compared
to the critical value χ2
0.05 (2) =5 . 9 9 .
Let us now turn our attention to the explanatory variables that are speciﬁc
to the collective approach. Two variables related to the sharing rule are signif-
icantly estimated at the 5% signiﬁcance level. Important with respect to the
collective model described above is the fact that a Wald test cannot reject the
restrictions (11) and (12). The test statistic equals 2.74 and is lower than the
critical value χ2
0.05 (2). The unitary monotonicity and quasi-concavity restric-
tions were tested by checking whether they are satisﬁed for all observations in
the sample.11 Contrary to the above collective restrictions, results are not quite
satisfactory. Monotonicity with respect to consumption is not satisﬁed for the
38 hours choice. The marginal utility of labour is positive for 74% of the labour
supply choices checked. The concavity restriction is not satisﬁed for 94% of the
labour supply choices.12 Since these unitary rejections are problematic from a
policy evaluation point of view, we re-estimated the model with monotonicity
with respect to consumption and the collective restrictions imposed.13 The esti-
mation results are reported in the third column of Table 2. Quite interestingly,
the number of correctly predicted labour supply choices increased rather dra-
matically. Moreover, the imposed restrictions cannot be rejected by means of
a likelihood ratio test; the test statistic of 6.99 is lower than the critical value
χ2
0.05 (3) =7 . 8 2 .
Using the estimated coeﬃcients and equations (11) and (12), we can derive
the sharing rule parameters κ1 and κ2. These are respectively equal to -0.82341
and 0.00047, with corresponding standard errors of 0.14595 and 0.00010. This
10implies the following sharing rule for the j’th hours choice of individual i (see
equation (8)):
φ(xij,z i)=( 0 .17659 + 0.00047 · zi) · xij. (13)
The share of total household consumption that is shifted to the female in a
couple is thus positively, and signiﬁcantly, related to her earning capacity. This
sharing rule enables us to estimate the private consumption assigned to the
female, given her earning capacity and total household consumption (see next
section).
[Table 2 about here]
5 Policy simulations
This section evaluates the Belgian 2001 Tax Reform Act. More speciﬁcally, we
will concentrate on the measures deﬁned in this reform that are applicable to
the couples in our selected sample. As has already been mentioned, a main
advantage of the collective approach is that it makes it possible to identify
gainers and losers from the tax reform at the individual level, rather than at
the household level. In other words, intrahousehold distributional issues can be
considered.
We simulated the tax reform by calculating the pre- and post reform hours
choices that are most likely given the estimated model parameters and the
household’s budget set (i.e., net incomes for all four hours choices) for all females
in couples. In general, two types of behavioural responses to the tax reform will
come into play. The ﬁrst eﬀect is due to the fact that the tax reform implies
a change of the household budget set. In other words, for each labour supply
choice, a diﬀerent net income is obtained after the tax reform. The impact
of the reform on the individuals’ labour supply and consumption will depend
on the standard interaction between income and substitution eﬀects. This is
not the end of the story, however, since the reform may also imply a change of
the bargaining position of the individuals in couples, which is captured by the
sharing rule. This alteration entails an impact on both the magnitude and the
allocation of total household consumption to the household members. It implies
an extra behavioural eﬀe c to nt o po ft h es t a n d a r de ﬀects that are incorporated
in the unitary approach.
Note that we do not focus on the actual reform here, but on two alternative
reforms that complement the tax reform with either a lump-sum tax on couples
or a proportional decrease of couples’ disposable incomes in order to preserve
revenue-neutrality (see Section 3.2). As already mentioned earlier, a trial-and-
error procedure was followed to determine the latter additional tax parameters.
It turns out that a lump-sum tax of 22 euro per week (or 1144 euro per year)
is needed to make the actual tax reform revenue-neutral for the couples in the
selected sample. The same tax revenue can be generated if one decreases couples’
disposable incomes after the actual tax reform by about 3.65%.
Table 3 gives some summary statistics based on the pre- and post reform sim-
ulations for couples. As is clear from the table, both alternative revenue-neutral
tax reforms are associated with very small positive behavioural responses: the
average labour supply of females in couples is increased by about 0.07%. Both
reforms also imply a slight increase of the average household consumption or net
11income. The impact of the reforms on the individual consumption levels diﬀers,
however. If the actual tax reform is made revenue-neutral by adding a lump-
sum tax at the couples’ level, then the average individual consumption of women
in couples increases slightly, whereas the average male consumption decreases
slightly. The reverse picture emerges if we focus on the second revenue-neutral
reform. If, next to the actual reform, households are also faced with a propor-
tional decrease in disposable income, then the average weekly consumption of
females in couples decreases by about two euro while the average consumption
of males increases by about the same amount. It is also striking that the av-
erage individual consumption of women (both before and after the reform) is
much lower than that of males. This lower consumption is compensated to some
extent, since women in couples work, on average, ten hours less per week than
their partners. Going somewhat further than a purely positive description of
the aggregate impact of the reform, under strong measurability and interper-
sonal comparability assumptions the utility of women is slightly increased on
average for the ﬁrst reform, while it is decreased for the second revenue-neutral
reform. Note that these results clearly show that intrahousehold distributional
issues may be important. Although both alternative tax reforms generate the
same tax revenue as in the pre reform situation, and entail similar labour supply
responses, the impact on intrahousehold allocations is quite diﬀerent. It seems
that women are better oﬀ, on average, if the actual tax reform is complemented
with a lump-sum tax, than when a proportional decrease of the disposable in-
come is added (see also further).
[Table 3 about here]
Tables 4 and 5 show simulated labour supply responses to both tax reforms
for females in couples. As is clear from the tables, responses are rather moderate.
Most of the females in couples remain in the status quo position (i.e., 98.5% are
on the diagonal in Table 4, while 99.4% do not change labour supply according to
Table 5). Interestingly, only females who worked full-time or did not participate
before the reform react; no changes occur for part-time working females. Note
also that both reforms imply a very small increase in labor force participation.
[Table 4 about here]
[Table 5 about here]
Let us ﬁnally concentrate on the number of gainers and losers from the
tax reforms. Contrary to studies based on unitary models, which can only
concentrate on households as a whole, the collective approach allows us to apply
a welfare analysis at the level of individuals. Tables 6 and 7 show the numbers
of gainers and losers from the tax reforms for individuals in couples. As is
clear from the tables, both revenue-neutral tax reforms imply a diﬀerent impact
on the welfare levels for diﬀerent households.14 Although the reforms imply a
strict Pareto improvement for many couples, a considerable number of couples
are characterized by both household members strictly losing with respect to
their pre reform situation. There are also many households in which the female
is better oﬀ after the reform, while the partner is worse oﬀ (or vice versa).
When we compare both revenue-neutral tax reforms, we can see that the ﬁrst
12reform (actual reform and lump sum tax) is associated with fewer couples where
both individuals gain from the reform than the second reform (actual reform
and percentage decrease of the households’ disposable incomes); these numbers
are respectively equal to 95 and 129. The ﬁrst tax reform further implies a
higher number of women who have a (weakly) increased utility level than the
second tax reform (239 versus 189 females who are better oﬀ). A reverse picture
emerges for males. In the ﬁrst reform, 138 males in couples are better oﬀ after
the reform, while this is the case for 186 males for the second reform.
[Table 6 about here]
[Table 7 about here]
Once again, although both alternative reforms generate the same tax revenue
and almost the same post reform labour supply for females, the impact on
individual welfare levels is quite diﬀerent. Women are, on average, better oﬀ
when a lump-sum tax is added to the actual reform in order to preserve revenue-
neutrality, than when the actual reform is complemented with a proportional
decrease of the household’s disposable income. The main reason for this result
can be found by examining the impact of the reforms on the earning capacity
of females (which positively aﬀects their consumption share). The lump-sum
component in the ﬁrst revenue-neutral reform has no eﬀect on earning capacity.
The percentage decrease of the household’s disposable income, however, does
impact this distribution factor. Ceteris paribus, the earning capacity will be
higher for the ﬁrst reform than for the second. This is reﬂected in a lower female
consumption share for the latter reform. Since labour supply remains constant
for most females, this lower consumption share is thus associated with a lower
utility level.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents a new methodology to estimate a discrete-choice model for
female labour supply. The model is cast in the collective setting and is fairly
general in that it allows for both nonparticipation and nonlinear taxation. Iden-
tiﬁcation of the model is obtained by assuming that some, but not all, preference
parameters of single females and those in couples are identical; marginal rates of
substitution between consumption and leisure may well diﬀer. By means of this
(not very restrictive) assumption, both females’ preferences and the rule gov-
erning the sharing of total household consumption, as a function of the earning
capacity of the female, are econometrically identiﬁable. This feature is rather
important, since it allows us to consider intrahousehold distributional issues, in
addition to standard interhousehold ones.
The model is applied to Belgian microdata and is used to evaluate the 2001
Tax Reform Act. This tax reform incorporates some important changes of the
pre reform tax system. Since the actual reform is not revenue-neutral, we con-
sidered two alternative reforms. The ﬁrst adds a lump-sum tax at the household
level to the actual reform in order to preserve revenue-neutrality. The second
reform keeps tax revenue constant by a proportional decrease of the household’s
disposable income after implementation of the actual reform.
13Two types of theoretical restrictions are implied by the speciﬁcm o d e lw e
use. A ﬁrst restriction is linked to the collective setting and is not rejected
by the data. The model also implies some standard unitary restrictions on
the identiﬁed female preferences. The latter restrictions, however, are rejected
when confronted with the data. As to the sharing rule, the earning capacity
of females has a signiﬁcantly estimated positive impact on the share in total
household consumption that is shifted to women.
The impact of both revenue-neutral tax reforms on hours and participa-
tion is moderate. About 1.5% of the females in couples change labour supply
after implementation of the ﬁrst reform, while this is the case for only 0.6%
of the females with respect to the second reform. Neither tax reforms imply
an unambiguously positive impact on the individuals’ welfare levels. For some
households, the tax reforms are a strict Pareto improvement. Other couples,
however, are characterized by both individuals strictly losing from the reforms.
In a considerable number of households, one individual is better oﬀ after the
reforms, while their partner is worse oﬀ. Although the impact on labour supply
is similar for both revenue-neutral reforms, they aﬀect the individuals’ welfare
in a diﬀerent way. Generally, the tax reform in which the actual reform is com-
plemented with a lump-sum tax is more beneﬁcial to females, than the reform
in which a proportional decrease in the household’s disposable income is added.
This can be explained by the diﬀerential impact of the reforms on female earning
capacity. Note that such results, which refer to the intrahousehold allocation
of welfare, cannot be obtained in the standard unitary approach to household
labour supply.
Although the obtained results are not entirely satisfactory due to the re-
jection of some behavioural restrictions, the approach shows its relevance in
analysing changes in ﬁscal policy. The study has its limitations, however. To
increase its empirical relevance, the model should be generalized so that it can
deal adequately with external eﬀects and the presence of children in the house-
hold. A second limitation of the study is that it does not take into account
elements of household public consumption. A large share of total household
means, after all, is spent on goods with a public consumption component, such
as rent or heating. Two recent studies that deal with household public con-
sumption in a diﬀerent way are Lewbel, Chiappori and Browning (2001) and
Chiappori, Blundell and Meghir (2002). Finally, the model does not incorporate
household production, which implies that an individual’s time endowment can
only be allocated to market time and pure leisure (see Apps and Rees, 1996,
1997, and Chiappori, 1997). The increasing availability of time budget studies
may allow a more realistic empirical modelling of household labour supply.
14Endnotes
1 Due to the lack of adequate data, the above model has an important weak-
ness: it does not incorporate household production (see Apps and Rees,
1996, 1997, and Chiappori, 1997). The simple dichotomy between market
time and leisure may be a questionable assumption in modelling couples’
labour supply decisions. The increasing availability of time budget studies
may enhance the empirical modelling of household labour supply taking
account of household production.
2 Strictly speaking, the function φ must give rise to a convex individual
budget set. If the tax function τc is increasing and convex in female labour
supply, then this requirement is satisﬁed if φ is increasing and concave in
the household’s net income x (see also Donni, 2003).
3 This variable also depends on the male’s productivity. It is, for example,
easily seen that, ceteris paribus, a female’s earning capacity decreases if
her husband’s gross income increases in a joint tax system with progressive
marginal rates.
4 Each variable that aﬀects the bargaining power of the individuals in a
household but does not aﬀect preferences can be taken up in the sharing
rule (such variables are usually called ‘distribution factors’). See Browning
and Chiappori (1998) and Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002) for some
examples. It may be diﬃcult, however, to ﬁnd good distribution factors.
Contrary to Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix (2002), an index capturing
divorce laws or laws on alimony cannot be used for Belgium, since all
regions have the same legislation on divorce and alimony.
5 More generally, the above approach requires that single women and fe-
males in couples have the same type of preferences (e.g., preferences that
can be represented by a quadratic direct utility function). The parame-
ters that completely deﬁne these preferences, however, may diﬀer between
both categories of women. In the estimation process, the utility function
that represents preferences is normalized such that parameters associated
with individual consumption are equal.
6 The objective of this tax, which was introduced in 1993, was to generate
extra means to meet the budget and debt criteria of the Maastricht Treaty.
7 This study does not make use of the ‘panel’ structure of the data. The
reason for this choice is that the SEP was subject to substantial attrition
between 1992 and 1997. Many new households entered the data set in
1997, while only a very small number of households were observed in both
waves of the SEP.
8 T h es a m p l eo fs i n g l em a l e si ss u b j e c tt ot h es a m es a m p l es e l e c t i o nr u l e s
as those for single females.
9 Observed hours  
f
0 (see Figures 1 and 3) were allocated to the elements of
the discrete choice set as follows:  f =0if  
f
0 =0 ;  f =2 0if  
f
0 ∈]0,25];
 f =3 0if  
f
0 ∈]25,35] and  
f
0 =3 8if  
f
0 > 35.
1510 Estimates are obtained by means of simulated maximum likelihood. The
number of randomly drawn values for υ  i and υ i equals 100.
11 The restrictions were tested for all four labour supply choices, taking into
account the corresponding consumption levels, for each observation (both
singles and women in couples). This amounts to checking the restrictions
for 4 × 468 = 1872 labour supply choices. Strictly speaking, restrictions
that involve the consumption level cf (notably, the monotonicity restric-
tion with respect to labour supply and the quasi-concavity restriction)
should be satisﬁed for all nonnegative consumption levels.
12 The model was also applied to the subsample of single women (to which
the unitary approach should be fully applicable). Monotonicity with re-
spect to consumption was rejected for the 38 hours labour supply choice.
Monotonicity with respect to labour was rejected for 25% of the labour
supply choices checked. Concavity was rejected in 87% of the cases. One
reason for these results might be that the model does not take into account
ﬁxed costs of work. Information on these costs, however, is lacking in the
dataset that we use.
13 Monotonicity with respect to consumption is imposed by means of the
linear restriction βc = −βc ·38. This implies that the collective restrictions








c 2 · 38.
Note that monotonicity with respect to labour supply and quasi-concavity
cannot be imposed without losing the ﬂexibility of the behavioural model.
14 The male’s utility level is represented by his individual consumption.
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Figure 4: Contractual working hours per week for single men
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Couples Single females
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Dummy for labour market participation female 0.77 0.42 0.94 0.24
Dummy for labour market participation male 1 0
Dummy 1 for schooling female 0.54 0.50 0.43 0.50
Dummy 2 for schooling female 0.25 0.44 0.32 0.47
Dummy 3 for schooling female 0.06 0.24 0.16 0.36
Dummy 1 for schooling male 0.57 0.50
Dummy 2 for schooling male 0.24 0.43
Dummy 3 for schooling male 0.08 0.28
Dummy 1 for region 0.24 0.43 0.30 0.46
Dummy 2 for region 0.04 0.21 0.19 0.39
Age female 36.68 9.72 38.17 9.98
Age male 38.63 9.70
Number of years employed female 12.26 9.24 15.10 9.59
Number of years employed male 18.47 10.89
Hourly gross wage rate female 11.66 3.93 13.01 5.56
Hourly gross wage rate male 14.65 5.88
Contractual working hours per week female 26.76 15.94 32.51 10.76
Contractual working hours per week male 37.99 2.06
Weekly consumption-based nonlabour income 40.09 109.58 57.92 55.07
Notes: Dummy for labour market participation: 1 = working. Dummy 1 for schooling: 1 =
secondary school (primary school benchmark). Dummy 2 for schooling: 1 = non academic
higher education. Dummy 3 for schooling: 1 = academic higher education. Dummy 1 for
region: 1 = Walloon Region (Flemish Region benchmark). Dummy 2 for region: 1 = Brussels
Capital Region. Monetary values are in euro.
20Table 2: Parameter estimates of the female labour supply model
Variable Unrestricted est. Restricted est.
¡
 f¢2
17.694 (3.106) 19.314 (3.116)
συ   0.263 (0.739) 0.107 (0.469) ¡
 f¢2 × education dummy 1 2.324 (1.362) 2.045 (1.353) ¡
 f¢2 × education dummy 2 0.084 (1.667) 0.123 (1.637)
¡
 f¢2 × education dummy 3 4.573 (3.310) 4.174 (2.879) ¡
 f¢2 × region dummy 1 0.733 (1.071) 0.918 (1.071) ¡
 f¢2 × region dummy 2 -0.407 (1.881) -0.409 (1.859) ¡
 f¢2 × dummy couple -11.937 (3.021) -12.591 (3.041) ¡
x ×  f¢
-2.759 (0.489) -3.114 (0.480) ¡
x ×  f¢
× dummy couple 1.917 (0.550) 2.564 (0.494) ¡
x ×  f¢
× dummy couple × earning capacity -5.58×10−7(7.94×10−7)- 1 . 4 6 ×10−6(2.59×10−7)
cf 91.099 (22.523) 118.332 (18.252)
x× dummy couple -105.679 (33.190) -97.436 (18.775)
x× dummy couple × earning capacity 0.073 (0.063) 0.056 (9.82×10−6)
 f -246.156 (92.383) -330.379 (77.873)
συ  3.523 (16.729) 2.450 (14.346)
 f× education dummy 1 -43.392 (50.534) -35.655 (50.407)
 f × education dummy 2 161.965 (76.989) 147.019 (75.105)
 f × education dummy 3 55.825 (179.637) 74.064 (153.146)
 f× region dummy 1 -20.215 (45.373) -26.916 (44.969)
 f× region dummy 2 51.272 (87.693) 50.672 (86.265)
 f× dummy couple 632.225 (174.151) 438.164 (79.691)
Log likelihood -288.026 -291.522
Correctly predicted observations 64% 79%
Notes: Estimates are obtained by simulated maximum likelihood. All parameter estimates
and standard errors (between brackets) are multiplied by 1000. Education dummy 1: 1 =
secondary schooling (primary schooling benchmark). Education dummy 2: 1 = non academic
higher education. Education dummy 3: 1 = academic higher education. Region dummy 1:
1 = Walloon Region (Flemish Region benchmark). Region dummy 2: 1 = Brussels Capital
Region. Dummy couple: 1 = couple (single woman is benchmark). Earning capacity is the
diﬀerence between the household’s disposable income when the female is working full time
and when she does not participate. Prediction of the labour supply for an observation is
obtained by selecting the hours choice with the highest probability.
21Table 3: Summary statistics couples pre reform versus post reform situation
Pre reform Post reform 1 Post reform 2
Mean labour supply females 27.50 27.52 27.52
Mean gross earnings couple 889.13 889.25 889.35
Mean income tax 354.35 354.35 354.35
Mean income tax rate 0.399 0.399 0.389
Mean household consumption 578.49 578.59 578.58
Mean individual consumption females 168.87 169.16 166.68
Mean individual consumption men 409.62 409.43 411.90
Mean utility females 17.80 17.81 17.75
Mean consumption share females 0.2919 0.2924 0.2881
Note: Monetary values are in euro per week; labour supply is in hours per week. Post
reform 1 is the actual tax reform with a lump-sum tax of 22 euro at a household level added.
Post reform 2 is the actual tax reform complemented with a proportional decrease of 3.65
percent of the couple’s disposable income.
Table 4: Pre reform versus post reform 1: labour supply of females in couples.
02 03 0 3 8T o t a l
09 0 1 0 1 9 2
20 0 6 0 0 6
30 0 0 1 0 1
38 0 2 1 238 241
Total 90 9 2 239 340
Note: Rows are pre reform labour supply, columns post reform. Post reform 1 is the actual
tax reform with an additional lump-sum tax of 22 euro at a household level.
Table 5: Pre reform versus post reform 2: labour supply of females in couples
02 03 0 3 8T o t a l
09 1 0 0 1 9 2
20 0 6 0 0 6
30 0 0 1 0 1
38 0 1 0 240 241
Total 91 7 1 241 340
Note: Rows are pre reform labour supply, columns post reform. Post reform 2 is the actual
tax reform complemented by a proportional decrease of 3.65 percent of the couple’s disposable
income.
22Table 6: Gainers and losers of tax reform 1
f(-) f(0) f(+)
m(-) 58 88 56
m(0) 0 0 0
m(+) 43 35 60
Note: Tax reform 1 is the actual tax reform with an additional lump-sum tax of 22 euro
at a household level. The variables m and f refer to, respectively, the utility level of males
and females in couples. The labels (-), (0) and (+) refer to a decrease, a status quo or an
increase in the corresponding utility level.
Table 7: Gainers and losers of tax reform 2
f(-) f(0) f(+)
m(-) 94 54 6
m(0) 0 0 0
m(+) 57 79 50
Note: Tax reform 2 is the actual tax reform complemented by a proportional decrease of 3.65
percent of the couple’s disposable income. The variables m and f refer to respectively the
utility level of males and females in couples. The labels (-), (0) and (+) refer to a decrease,
a status quo or an increase in the corresponding utility level.
23